The fiscal inefficiencies associated with the soft budget constraint problem of subnational governments have long been recognized as one of the critical pitfalls of fiscal federalism. Recent theoretical research suggests, however, that weak local-level budget incentives and excessive borrowing can be overcome when the financial implications of spending decisions are internalized within a jurisdiction, and that the latter can be achieved by assigning (a sufficient degree of) revenue autonomy to subnational governments. We test this proposition on a sample of 23 OECD countries over the 1975-2000 period, and find evidence supportive of the idea that higher revenue decentralization (measured as the sub-national governments" share of own source tax revenues) is associated with improved sub-national government budget balances.
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INTRODUCTION
The substantial budget deficits across OECD countries in the 1970s triggered much academic research, both theoretical and empirical, on central and general government budget processes and fiscal policy. The recent financial crisis brought the issue of public debt management once again to the center of economic policy as well as academic debates. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, however, the tendency since the 1980s towards more decentralized government structures (Rodden 2006, Freitag and Vatter 2008) has led to a situation where sub-national governments (henceforth: SNG) now also significantly contribute to public sector indebtedness. Recent data from the IMF"s 2012 Fiscal Monitor indeed suggests that a median SNG in federal countries such as Australia, Canada, Spain or the United States saw its budget balance to GDP ratio decline by over 0.5 percentage point between the period 2005-07 (i.e., pre-crisis) and 2008-10 (i.e., post-crisis).
Although German states, in maintaining their pre-crisis budget balances, provide an exception to this trend (IMF 2012) , they have recently been ranked as the largest sub-national debtors in Europe (Rodden and Wibbels 2010) .
The factors that affect fiscal imbalances and debt accumulation at the SNG level are, however, likely to differ from those at the central government level since vertical and horizontal relationships between various government units play a critical role. In this respect, a vast foregoing literature has analyzed, for instance, the influence of perceived or real soft-budget constraints on SNG"s fiscal discipline 1 and assessed the effectiveness of fiscal rules -often vertically imposed by the center on the public finances of lower government levels -as a tool to ensure SNG"s fiscal discipline (Ter-Minassian 2007) . In this paper, we concentrate on the role of SNG revenue independence for local-level budgetary (im)balances. This focus is driven by the observation that SNG expenditures are generally at least partly funded via transfers from the central government, rather than through full local revenue autonomy -a situation described as "partial" fiscal decentralization by, among others, Brueckner (2009) , Solé-Ollé (2011) and Borge et al. (2012) .
While such situation may reflect a balancing act between the desire towards decentralized provision of public goods and the need to constrain the Leviathan (Jametti and Joanis 2011, Hatfield and Padro-i-Miquel 2012) , it implies that SNG might not be fully accountable for a complete set of budgetary allocations and their outcomes (Devarajan et al. 2007) . This leads to a number of ways in which SNG revenue autonomy (or lack thereof) may impinge on SNG fiscal (in)discipline.
First, SNG revenue autonomy might mitigate fiscal indiscipline and indebtedness because it implies greater flexibility in budgetary terms (IMF 2009 , Feld and Baskaran 2010 , Eyraud and Lusinyan 2011 . In the absence of substantial revenue autonomy, managing budget expenditures is the only available instrument to curb deficit growth. However, expenditures are often politically extremely costly to cut. While taxation is likewise politically costly (e.g. Vermeir 2008a, 2008b) , extending revenue autonomy increases the options of SNG policy-making. The flexibility and diversification possibilities offered by having multiple policy instruments provides the opportunity to minimize the marginal political cost of deficit reduction policies (Hettich and Winer 1984 , 1988 , 1999 , and thereby may buttress budgetary discipline.
Second, more autonomy may simply imply more responsibility (Feld and Baskaran 2010) .
When SNG have only a limited capacity to mobilize additional revenues, voters, politicians and creditors of subnational debt tend to shift the responsibility of excessive deficits and insolvency to the central government (the so-called "governance trap"; e.g. Devarajan et al. 2007 ). This, however, reduces SNG incentives to maintain a healthy fiscal balance.
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Finally, central governments are often tempted to bail out SNG despite their ex ante promise to commit to the optimal inter-governmental transfer policy. If anticipated by SNG, such soft budget constraints will, as mentioned above, generate incentive distortions -leading to an important moral hazard problem. However, soft budget constraints are often viewed as a consequence of a mismatch between SNG expenditure and revenue functions, implying that assigning an optimal level of revenue autonomy to the SNG will assist in restoring the "hardness" of local budget constraints (e.g. Garcia-Mila et al. 2001) .
Although these theoretical arguments are getting increasing attention in the literature on fiscal federalism, empirical verification of these ideas has thus far been limited. To the best of our knowledge, De Mello (2000), Rodden (2002) , Baskaran (2010 Baskaran ( , 2012 , Neyapti (2010) and Foremny (2011) are the only studies directly addressing the role of revenue decentralization for subnational fiscal discipline, and their results remain somewhat mixed. In relation to these studies, we extend the discussion in three ways.
First, we analyze a new annual panel dataset of 23 OECD countries over the period. This gives us a much larger sample size than previous studies, which is mainly driven by the fact that our time period is substantially longer. This is possible because the 2011 edition of the IMF"s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the key source on SNG budget balances 2 , for the first time linked the current data (1990 onwards) to its historic database (1973 onwards).
Second, earlier work usually measures SNG revenue decentralization by the share of SNG revenue in total budget revenue; a measure widely criticized for not distinguishing between SNG"s real functions and those imposed and regulated by the center (e.g. Ebel and Yilmaz 2002, Asatryan and . We account for the degree of autonomy that SNG possess over their fiscal policies.
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Finally, in addition to SNG budget balances, we follow Rodden (2002) in also looking at general government (GG) fiscal outcomes. Some authors argue that excessive borrowing need not necessarily lead to a worsening of SNG fiscal balances because the central government may compensate them through inter-governmental grants -and use this motivation to employ GG data as a proxy for SNG fiscal outcomes (e.g. Baskaran 2010 , Neyapti 2010 ). Rodden"s (2002) results - showing that revenue autonomy improves fiscal balance at SNG level but hurts fiscal balance at GG level -are in line with such view. We adopt a new dataset measuring GG accumulated debt (Abbas et al. 2010) to re-investigate this issue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the existing literature. Section 3 discusses the measurement challenges of federalism variables and data employed. Sections 4 and 5 specify the econometric model and present the empirical findings, respectively. Finally, section 6 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A substantial academic literature examines the relation between various dimensions of decentralization and (local) government indebtedness. However, only few existing studies explicitly deal with SNG revenue autonomy. 3 These contributions are either cross-country comparisons or are based on analyses of one particular country with a federal structure of governance and varying levels of fiscal autonomy among SNG. While the former might allow more general conclusions, the latter provides the possibility to reduce empirical problems associated with wide-ranging institutional heterogeneity across countries.
Looking first at the local-level studies, Argimon and Hernandez de Cos (2012) find that greater discretionary revenue-raising capacity in Spanish regions is associated with more disciplined fiscal behavior of SNG. In a study on German municipalities, Geys et al. (2010) demonstrate that greater municipal revenue autonomy is associated with higher local government efficiency. Freitag and Vatter (2008) Neyapti (2010) uses a sample varying from 18 to 43 countries of up to 30 years (depending on the specification) and finds that both revenue and expenditure decentralization improve consolidated government budget discipline. However, the paper fails to consider SNG budgetary data independently, and relies solely on the IMF"s GFS database to measure fiscal decentralization.
Finally, Foremny (2011) studies SNG budget deficits using a revenue autonomy measure based on the OECD (1999) methodology employed by Stegarescu (2005) . The paper also develops its own indicator of borrowing rules based on an unweighted average of several legal and numerical criteria defined by the European Commission (2009). Foremny (2011) 
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To empirically analyze the relation between SNG revenue autonomy and fiscal discipline, we Note that we thereby separate country-years with high and low SNG revenue autonomy (defined as a revenue autonomy index above/below 0.3 -see below for details of the index employed) to get a first impression as regards the potential influence of SNG revenue autonomy on fiscal outcomes. revenue autonomy of "second degree" (which additionally considers shared tax revenues). The latter is obviously a much less stringent definition of SNG tax autonomy, and we will put most weight on the former variable in the analysis below.
To ensure the validity of our inferences, our regression models (see below) will also include a substantial number of control variables tapping into a wide range of previously documented determinants of government debts and deficits. To preserve space, the exact data sources and short descriptions of all control variables employed are briefly summarized in table 1.
This table also includes summary statistics for all variables.
[ Before turning to our empirical model specification, it is important to note that our dataset also includes two measures of fiscal rules. The first is developed by Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) and Thornton and Mati (2007) , and distinguishes between four categories of institutional rules on borrowing. The second is provided by Rodden (2002) and constitutes a weighted average of the following six criteria (see also IADB 1997): ability to borrow, necessity of authorization by the center, numerical constraints on borrowing, limits on the use of debt, existence or importance of SNG banks and ownership of public enterprises with liberal borrowing practices. As we rely on regression specifications with country fixed effects throughout the analysis (see below), neither of these time-invariant indices can be directly included. Nevertheless, given the importance often awarded to fiscal rules (see section 1), we replicated our analysis using random effects models, and included several indicators of borrowing restrictions in these models. No significant effects were found (details available on request).
MODEL SPECIFICATION(S)
Using the data described above, our baseline specification takes the following form:
(1)
where the dependent variable is the SNG budget surplus (as a share of total revenues) of country i at time t. TaxAutonomy i,t is principally measured by Stegarescu"s (2005) Note that the model is specified in first differences. The reason for this is that the LevinLin-Chu panel unit root test (Levin et al. 2002) showed that SNG budget balances as well as both measures of SNG revenue autonomy are subject to a significant degree of inertia. The results of these tests in table 2 indeed indicate that the null hypothesis of no panel unit root cannot be reject for these three key variables in levels, whereas it can be rejected for the first (and second) differences of these same variables.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Equation (1) exploits the annual nature of the data. One potential concern with using such annual observations, however, is that they may be contaminated by counter-cyclical budgetary policies, inter-temporal tax or expenditure smoothing and other short-term deviations (Rodden 2002) . To accommodate this, we follow De Mello (2000) and Rodden (2002) in also estimating a model based on 5-year averages (equation (2)). Clearly, as non-stationarity is less of an issue in such a framework, we can simply specify the model in levels:
As mentioned above, we not only look at SNG budget balances, but also consider the budget balance of the general government (i.e., including SNG and CG). Consequently, our third and final model has the change in the general government debt to GDP ratio as the dependent variable:
5. RESULTS
SNG budget balances
Starting with the results for SNG budget balances in table 3 (using model 1 above), Column 1 can be considered as the baseline specification. Columns 2 through 3 gradually expand the set of control variables with additional socio-demographic and institutional variables, while columns 4
and 5 account for potential dynamic features in SNG and CG budget balances, respectively.
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Columns 6 and 7 replicate the specifications of columns 1 and 3 using instead the second degree of revenue autonomy. Columns 8 and 9 do the same while allowing for a non-linear relation between revenue autonomy (of the first degree) and SNG budget balances.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
As can be seen from table 3, SNG revenue autonomy shows a significantly positive relation to SNG budget balances. This is robust in terms of the size as well as the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate across all specifications in columns 1 through 5. Hence, even with the most extensive set of control variables, an increase in the share of SNG own-source revenues in its total revenues is associated with a more positive budget balance (or lower budget deficits). This is in line with our central proposition that SNG revenue autonomy strengthens their fiscal accountability and is associated with the maintenance of healthier (local) public finances. The size of the estimate is also economically significant: i.e., when the share of SNG own-source revenues in total government revenues increases by one percentage point, SNG budget balance to revenue ratio shows an improvement of 0.5 percentage points. Note that the quadratic form of revenue autonomy is insignificant (see columns 8 and 9), thus rejecting the non-linearity hypothesis.
When expanding our definition of SNG revenue autonomy to also include revenues that are shared between the central and sub-national level, we find a similar positive relation (see columns 6 and 7). However, the coefficient estimate, as well as its statistical significance, is substantially lower than in the first half of table 3. This supports the idea that SNG accountability is strengthened much more by own-source revenues -over which SNG have full autonomy -than by shared taxes -where central governments have important (if not complete) decision-making power. This reduced independence leads to weakened accountability, and translates into some distortion of SNG budget incentives.
While table 3 exploits all available yearly information, such approach, as mentioned, may be affected by various short-term aspects of government budget balances (Rodden 2002) . Table 4 therefore presents the results of model (2), which uses the same dataset as before but collapses the data in 5-year averages. Although the sample size is naturally much reduced here, we find the same positive relation as in table 3. That is, a high degree of SNG revenue autonomy remains associated with improved budget balances at the sub-national level. In the first two columns of table 4, the coefficient size and significance levels are near-identical to those reported in table 3. The same conclusion holds also for the less restrictive definition of SNG revenue autonomy (see columns 6
and 7), while, as before, we again can find no evidence suggesting that the relation is non-linear (see columns 8 and 9). Still, including the full set of controls (including lagged budget balance variables) strongly weakens our findings. While the coefficient estimate remains robustly positive also in these estimations, it loses statistical significance at conventional levels. It should be noted,
however, that at this point the number of observations becomes quite restrictive, and the regressions tends to run into a low degrees-of-freedom problem.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Before turning to the results for model (3) on GG fiscal outcomes, we cast a brief look on the results for the control variables in tables 3 and 4. Concentrating on the variables that show significant effects in most regressions in table 3, we find that CG balances are positively related to those of SNG. This result is in line with the so-called "copycat" hypothesis, which states that the fiscal good and bad times of SNG might be linked to those of higher-level governments (Rodden 2002; Foremny 2011) . Output growth behaves in line with expectations based on the existence of automatic stabilizers (though its effect is far from robust across various models): i.e., SNG fiscal position improves during economic upswings through increased tax revenue and reduced costs of unemployment programs and the vice versa during recessions.
Regarding the country openness measure, we find that SNG of relatively more open economies on average suffer higher deficits. Table 4 , however, shows the opposite, positive effect of the openness variable. This may be due to the fact that table 3 concentrates more on short-run effects, while the use of 5-year averages in table 4 shifts attention more to medium-term effects.
From that perspective, the sign change my simply mean that cross-country tax competition hurts SNG tax revenues, at least temporarily (Razin and Sadka 1991, Baskaran 2010) . Also, the availability of external sources of borrowing may worsen budgetary imbalances particularly in the short run, while in the long run greater exposure to (international) market scrutiny may create additional incentives for governments to promote fiscal discipline (De Mello 2005).
Three institutional variables -autonomy, state elections and government ideology -are significant determinants of SNG fiscal balances, though their effects remain substantively small.
As autonomy is a dummy variable equal to one for countries which have autonomous or selfgoverning regions, the former effect suggests lower SNG budget deficits in countries with 14 autonomous regions. The positive sign of the state elections dummy (1 if both the executive and legislative branches of the regional governments are locally elected) supports the beneficial effect of SNG political accountability. Both variables together suggest an important benefit to political decentralization, since locally elected, autonomous SNG might face higher public pressure towards maintaining balanced budgets. The small negative coefficient of the government ideology dummy is in line with the standard hypothesis that left-wing governments are more favorable towards higher government spending (e.g. Hibbs 1977 ), which might spill over into higher deficits.
Finally, lagged budgetary balances are also significant but with negative coefficients, suggestion a tendency towards mean-reversion. Sustainability considerations are one potential explanation for this finding: i.e. negative fiscal balances in one year might put pressure on politicians and policy-makers to improve the budget next year. Alternatively, a strong improvement in one"s fiscal position may well induce optimism and higher spending, which would undo at least part of the past budgetary improvements (Tujula and Wolswijk 2004) .
GG budget balances
Some authors argue that excessive borrowing need not necessarily lead to a worsening of SNG fiscal balances because, in what could be seen as a vertical spillover effect, the central government might be providing financial relief through, say, bailout funds, increased grants and so on (e.g. Baskaran 2010 , Neyapti 2010 . Based on such argumentation, they then employ consolidated government budgetary outcomes as a proxy to capture the variation in SNG fiscal stance. In the current section, we adopt newly available data on GG stock of accumulated debt (Abbas et al. 2010) to evaluate the validity of this approach by comparing its results with those obtained for SNG budget balances in tables 3 and 4. The estimation results from model (3) are summarized in table 5, where the dependent variable is the change of the GG debt to GDP ratio.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The important point to make here is that our measure of local revenue autonomy remains statistically insignificant in all specifications in table 5. This suggests that using GG fiscal data as a proxy for SNG fiscal outcomes is inappropriate and leads to incorrect inferences regarding the role of SNG revenue autonomy on SNG fiscal (in)discipline. Interestingly, this conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the argumentation employed to rely on GG outcomes appears to rely on a flawed assumption regarding inter-governmental transfers. It would indeed require that intergovernmental transfers move in counter-cyclical fashion. Rodden and Wibbels (2010) and IMF (2012), however, show that these transfers are at best a-cyclical -most likely reflecting that transfer allocation formulas rest on other principles, such as revenue equalization. In other words, in order to legitimately employ consolidated government budgetary variables as a proxy for SNG fiscal stance, one would have to show the exact relation between CG and SNG fiscal data, else the GG data approach will remain non-transparent.
Reverse causality
One issue ignored thus far in our analysis is the fact that SNG revenue autonomy might be endogenous to local governments" budgetary situation. Federal governments might indeed react to escalating SNG debts and deficits by enacting legislation reducing SNG autonomy. In other words, fiscal decentralization might be extended when local governments "prove" they can handle this responsibility, but is taken away again when they show themselves to be fiscally irresponsible. One approach to deal with such potential reverse causation is to rely on an instrumental variables estimator. This, however, requires instruments that are strongly correlated with SNG revenue autonomy, but do not independently affect SNG and GG fiscal outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, such variables are not readily available. Instead, we therefore take a different approach by exploiting data obtained from Hooghe et al. (2008) on the degree of SNG fiscal autonomydefined as the "extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population" -as encoded in a country"s legislation. 6 To the extent that federal governments react to a lack of SNG budget discipline by enacting legislation reducing SNG fiscal autonomy, we would expect that fiscal autonomy declines in the period following budget imbalances.
To test this prediction, we concentrate on all observations where the SNG budget balance is either negative (N=220) or positive (N=229) in year t, and calculate the change in SNG fiscal autonomy over the subsequent three-and five-year periods. The results are summarized in table 6, where we present the observed changes in SNG fiscal autonomy.
[ TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] Table 6 illustrates that fiscal autonomy does not decline after SNG budget deficits. This holds both when regarding the three or five years subsequent to SNG budget deficits. In fact, while the degree of SNG fiscal autonomy reveals a notable upward trend in the three-or five-year period following positive SNG budget balances (with 0.082 to 0.121 steps on Hooghe et al."s (2008) five-point scale), it appears to stay constant after SNG budget deficits (the 0.013 and 0.038 values reported are statistically insignificant). Both effects are statistically significantly different from each other at conventional confidence levels -as indicated by the p-value of the difference-in-means t-test in the bottom row of table 6. Hence, we cannot substantiate a declining trend after SNG budget deficits.
Once awarded, it might simply be too difficult for CG to take back SNG revenue autonomy. These results thus provide only partial confirmation of the argument that central governments decide on SNG revenue autonomy based on their fiscal history. While this suggests that endogeneity is of relatively limited concern here, it does imply that we cannot clearly disentangle the causal connection between SNG revenue autonomy and SNG fiscal outcomes.
CONCLUSION
In OECD countries, on average half of SNG public expenditures are financed by locally administered taxes over which SNG have the autonomy to decide both the tax rate and the tax base independently from the center (e.g. Bloechliger and Petzold 2009) . The other half is covered through revenue-sharing arrangements, inter-governmental transfers, and SNG borrowing.
Substantial variation exists, however, between OECD countries. This article asked whether this variation in the degree of decentralization of revenue-related decision-making affects SNG-level budgetary (im)balances. This question recently gained substantial theoretical consideration in light of the current pressures on policy-makers to (re)establish sustainable fiscal governance. From a theoretical perspective, one can indeed argue that a sufficient degree of control over revenue resources should be assigned to the SNG, because revenues obtained from the other mentioned sources tend to create inappropriate incentives (such as soft budget constraints, common pool problems, inefficiencies associated with fiscal rules and borrowing constraints, and so on).
Based on a new panel dataset including 23 OECD countries from 1975 to 2000, our results
indicate that greater fiscal autonomy is indeed associated with higher SNG budget discipline. This suggests that, while a broader constellation of political, market and fiscal institutions should be considered for sustaining sound fiscal policies, the availability of own revenue sources may be a component allowing SNG to maintain a healthy fiscal balance. Yet, even when assuming that causality runs from revenue autonomy to fiscal discipline (which, as mentioned, could not be conclusively demonstrated here), one should keep in mind that raising SNG revenue autonomy 18 may face institutional constraints (such as the capacity of SNG tax administration) as well as economic challenges (e.g., increased scope for horizontal and vertical tax competition, fiscal disparities and/or adverse distributive effects across regions). Careful consideration of such effects is essential to generate the right policy decision regarding the need and/or benefits of (further) revenue decentralization. 
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